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Bid-rent curves are incorporated in a stochastic dynamic programming model of land 
development around a city when farmland generates both positive and negative externalities.   
The model delineates how the quantities of land in various uses over time should depend on the 
relative social weights assigned to the competing agricultural externalities. 
 Optimal Land Conversion at the Rural-Urban Fringe with Positive and Negative 
Agricultural Externalities  
Land allocation has been a source of conflict between individuals, groups, and nations 
throughout history.  Though many such disputes have been settled through violence, the modern 
market is often relied upon as a peaceful means to allocate land.  Naturally, agriculture is a major 
landholder in any nation, and farm activity generates several externalities that affect nearby 
residents.  These externalities imply that the market allocation of land may not be in society’s 
best interest, and much of the debate concerning land policy at the rural-urban fringe has 
therefore focused on farmland and farm activity. 
As communities grow, there can be controversy over the speed and extent to which 
farmland is converted to non-farm uses.  On the one hand, it has long been recognized that farms 
generate pollution such as runoff, groundwater contamination, and offensive odors.  Its nonpoint 
source nature and spatial variability make agricultural pollution difficult to regulate, but 
increasing public pressure over the past three decades has prompted several governments to 
enact environmental provisions for farmers, even at the national level.  The U.S. Congress, for 
example, has acted in recent farm legislation to protect wetlands and highly erodible cropland 
(Heimlich; Ribaudo et al.), and has empowered the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate 
dangerous pesticides and animal waste (Cropper et al.; USDA/USEPA).   
On the other hand, both urban and non-farm rural residents value open space and farm 
landscapes.  Beginning in 1971 with the New York Agricultural Districts Law, all states and 
many communities have farmland retention programs in place (Gustafson; Heimlich).  These 
policies include numerous institutional measures to encourage farmland retention, as well as 
standard remedies such as preferential property taxes, subsidies, and controls on land use, 
including transfer or purchase of development rights.   2 
Although recent empirical studies have confirmed the sometimes substantial willingness 
for households to bear additional tax burdens in order to retain farmland (Lopez et al.; Hackl and 
Pruckner), we know little about the effectiveness of such policies.  Their precise goals are often 
not well articulated, and we still know relatively little about the nature of land use decisions or 
the development process itself.  What we do know is that as developed countries explicitly 
recognize the multifunctional nature of agriculture, there will surely be increased interest in 
similar policies around the world (OECD, 1997a, b). 
When land is converted to non-agricultural uses, nearby residents avoid agricultural 
pollution, but the landscape amenity benefits are sacrificed, as is the option to develop later when 
the returns to development may be even higher.  The socially optimal decision thus depends on 
current benefits and costs as well as option value.  Yet, even if all these values can be observed 
or calculated, their implications for selecting a policy are not transparent.  If amenity values are 
the only concern, agricultural land should be protected from being developed through subsidies 
or land use regulations.  If concerns about agricultural pollution are also significant, the optimal 
land use strategy must include environmental regulation, or possibly the removal of some land 
from agriculture to provide open space as a buffer between urban and agricultural activity. 
This paper proposes a framework to determine the optimal patterns of land conversion in 
a growing community.  The model incorporates spatial features, allowing both public and private 
returns from various land uses to depend on location.  Because development is both costly and 
considered irreversible, the land allocation process is viewed as a dynamic process where future 
events are uncertain.  A spatial theory of land use that generalizes von Thünen’s bid-rent curves 
is incorporated into a stochastic dynamic programming framework, treating the conversion 
process at each location as an optimal stopping problem under uncertainty.  This is the first   3 
model that accommodates both positive and negative externalities in determining optimal 
patterns of land use over time and space. 
The analysis leads to several theoretical conclusions and implications for empirical 
modeling.  It reveals precisely how policies to affect land conversion should depend on the 
relative weights the community assigns to the competing agricultural externalities, and the option 
value associated with the uncertain private returns from delaying conversion.  Because the 
positive and negative externalities affect the socially optimal land use configuration differently, 
empirical land conversion models must acknowledge the multifunctional nature of agricultural 
activity, and avoid specifications that focus only on the most pervasive externality or combine all 
external values into a single “net” measure (Ollikainen).  
The most notable result is that the multifunctionality of agriculture, combined with the 
inherently dynamic nature of land conversion, may imply that farmland is being converted too 
slowly.  While farmers are clearly not being rewarded for the amenity benefits they provide to 
nearby households, an optimal set of policies would reduce agricultural pollution and raise the 
external benefits even more.  When this happens, the potential value of developing farmland 
(which is near other farmland) also increases, and the net result may be a faster rate of 
conversion.  This possibility is formalized in the theoretical model below, and its empirical 
plausibility is demonstrated through numerical simulations of metropolitan areas in the United 
States. 
The following section sets forth the theoretical model and develops the major conceptual 
results.  Using this framework, the third section describes the specification, method, and results 
of empirical simulations of a typical city in the United States.  The conclusions and policy 
implications of the results are discussed in the final section.    4 
Theoretical Model 
  In a spatial economy, land at each location is a distinct commodity.  From the observation 
that individuals usually consume land in only one place, we can infer that the tradeoffs between 
any two parcels are nonconvex: Given any set of relative prices for separate parcels, agents 
almost always choose the corner solution of consuming land at only one location.  Because 
solutions to agents’ optimization problems cannot be easily characterized under nonconvexity, 
spatial economic models assume that individuals consume one contiguous land plot but choose 
its location and size along with the consumption of non-land commodities (Fujita). 
  As in much of the urban economics literature, the monocentric urban model is relied 
upon here to explain land use.  The “model city,” which is assumed to be built on a featureless 
plain, encircles a single central business district (CBD) where all shopping and employment 
opportunities are located.  All households, identical except for where they live, earn an annual 
income of y; a household living r miles from the CBD incurs a yearly transportation cost of T(r), 
leaving a location adjusted income of Ir = y – T(r).
1  By generalizing von Thünen’s bid rent 
curves, Alonso (1964), Muth (1969), and Mills (1972) developed a unified theory of urban land 
use in a monocentric city, where households’ bid rent curves for housing land describe their 
willingness-to-pay for land at each location.  Solow modernized this theory by deriving bid rent 
functions using duality. 
  Because all locations at a common distance to the CBD are the same in this model, the 
city can be regarded as a series of concentric rings of development, where each ring is indexed 
by its radial distance to the city center (r).  If development has proceeded out to some urban 
                                                 
1 This model is clearly an abstraction; most cities have irregular shapes, heterogeneous land parcels that are 
equidistant to the CBD, and dispersed employment centers.  Nonetheless, the model still provides a good statistical 
description for many urban areas in the United States (Jordan et al.).     5 
fringe distance rf, the goal is to determine when (if ever) the farmland in rings rf + 1, rf + 2, … is 
converted under optimal planning or free markets, assuming that development is irreversible. 
  If land at any location is developed, households living there will enjoy utility equal to 
U(c, s, a, e) each year, where c is (annual) non-land consumption, s is the size of land plot for 
each house, a is amenities from nearby undeveloped land, and e is emissions of agricultural 
pollution.  U is increasing in c, s, and a, and decreasing in e.  Assuming that residents may move 
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This function represents the maximum yearly benefit per acre of land that accrues to a household 
with income Ir, when the target utility level is u, and environmental quality is (a, e).
2  Stated 
differently, ψ (⋅ ) is the yearly willingness-to-pay per acre of housing land in ring r. 
  To understand the intuition for bid rent, consider the budget constraint for a household in 
ring r: Ir = c + Rs, where R represents the rent paid (per acre) for land.  Solving the budget 
constraint for rent, R = (Ir – c)/s; the problem in (1) is therefore to maximize R with respect to c 
and s, subject to a constraint on utility.  The geometry of this maximization problem is shown in 
Figure 1.  The utility constraint requires the choice of (c, s) to lie along the indifference curve 
BDC.  If, for example, point B is chosen, land rent is the slope of the budget line ABC.  Because 
there exist steeper budget lines (i.e., with a larger slope) that also satisfy the constraint, a point 
like  B is not a solution.  The solution is at point D, where the budget line is tangent to the 
                                                 
2  ψ  is the benefit from land only; services from capital improvements (the housing structure) are part of the 
numeraire commodity c.   6 
indifference curve, and bid rent ψ  is the slope of the line ADE.  In general, bid rent is the slope of 
the line emanating from A that is tangent to the indifference curve. 
  The envelope theorem applied to (1) implies that ψ  is increasing in Ir and a, and 
decreasing in u and e; bid rent rises with income and amenities, but falls if opportunities 
elsewhere become better or if emissions become higher.  These changes can be clearly seen from 
Figure 1.  As Ir increases, point A moves upward, and the optimal budget line becomes steeper.  
On the other hand, an increase in u shifts the indifference curve outward, implying the line 
between A and a tangency becomes flatter.  Because ue < 0 and ua > 0, an increase in e also shifts 
the indifference curve outward, while an increase in a shifts it inward. 
If land remains in farming, it generates yearly revenue equal to pf(z) per acre, where p is 
the price of farm output, f(z) is the production function (assumed twice differentiable, increasing, 
and strictly concave), and z is a vector of inputs that must be chosen.  A corresponding input 
price vector w represents the opportunity cost of obtaining inputs from outside the city.  As a by-
product of market output, agriculture generates the two externalities a and e. 
In a spatial framework, the social values of these by-products depend not only on the 
farm production process, but also on the location of households and farms.  In general, the effect 
on surrounding households decays with their distance from agriculture.  Here, assume distance is 
measured so that agriculture affects only households in the adjacent ring.  If “leapfrog 
development” is precluded, all rings out to the urban fringe are developed, and the innermost 
ring of farmland affects only the outermost ring of households; farm externalities at more distant 
locations can be ignored.  Analytically, this assumption implies that the decision to expand the 
city into one more ring of farmland involves only the activities on two rings.  A more general 
model includes more rings in the decision but leads to the same conclusions.   7 
Because there is no leapfrogging, the only way a household in ring r can receive amenity 
benefits is if ring r + 1 remains undeveloped (r – 1 is developed by assumption).  It is sufficient 
to regard a as a discrete variable that equals one when the next ring is undeveloped and zero 
otherwise.  Similarly, emissions at r are a non-decreasing and convex function of farm inputs at r 
+ 1; e = g(z), where g′ , g′′  ≥  0, and g(0) = 0.  Bid rent for a household in a ring adjacent to 
agriculture is thus ψ (I, u, 1, g(z)), and for all other households inside the city it is ψ (I, u, 0, 0).  For 
brevity, denote these bid rent functions ψ 1(I, u) and ψ 0(I, u), respectively.   
Observations of y and u evolve according to two (exogenous) Markov processes.  Given 
the current year observations yt and ut, yt+1 and ut+1 follow the cumulative distribution functions 
Gy(yt+1; yt) and Gu(ut+1; ut), respectively.  The expected values of both variables increase over 
time; i.e., E[yt+1 | yt ] ≥  yt and E [ut+1 | ut ] ≥  ut.  Moreover, they satisfy “positive persistence” in the 
sense of first order stochastic dominance: ∂ Gy/∂ yt < 0 and ∂ Gu/∂ ut < 0, which ensures that larger 
current values of yt and ut shift the distributions of yt+1 and ut+1 to the right.  Note that Ir,t+1 
inherits its distribution from Gy, and that incomes on r and r + 1 differ by transportation cost: Irt 
= Ir+1,t + [T(r+1) – T(r)] ≡  Ir+1,t + ∆ T.  Finally, assume that the domains of y and u are compact so 
that ψ 1 and ψ 0 are bounded functions.  
Socially Optimal Land Use 
  Suppose that a social planner manages all land in the urban area.  In a spatial economy, 
the planner could not maximize welfare by solving a Pareto-type problem because the solution 
will assign different utility levels to identical individuals (Mirlees).  Since a market equilibrium 
with identical agents cannot produce such an outcome, urban models typically avoid this 
“unequal treatment of equals” by solving the dual of the welfare problem, where the social 
surplus of achieving a common utility level is maximized (and the cost is thereby minimized).  In   8 
a dynamic model, the planner’s goal is to maximize the stream of surpluses (i.e., the property 
value) when utility is set at the reservation level u. 
In the present context, the planner must solve a recursive series of problems.  In any 
period, he must decide whether to develop the innermost ring of farmland.  To make this choice, 
he considers the effect on property value of the farmland if it is developed, as well as the 
property value change on the outermost ring of households.  If he does not develop it in the 
current year, he faces exactly the same problem the following period; if he develops, the problem 
has an identical structure but involves the development choice for the next ring of farmland.   
Below, the planner’s problem is derived for an arbitrary point in the development process, where 
the last ring of development is at distance r and the first ring of farmland is at r + 1.  
 In  ring  r, property value depends on households’ bid rent, which in turn depends on the 
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given information in t.  The expression for H0 follows from irreversibility; agricultural 
externalities disappear forever once ring r + 1 is developed.  If ring r + 1 remains undeveloped in 
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If development occurs in τ , property value becomes H0.  If not, households earn a current return 
of ψ 1 and face the possibility of development in τ  + 1.   
Because delaying development preserves the option to develop in the future, the value of 
farmland in ring r + 1 includes agricultural value as well as an option value that depends on   9 
potential returns to housing.  Assuming for simplicity that agricultural prices and technology do 
not vary over time, the capitalized value of farm production is a constant, and the option value of 
developing varies with income and reservation utility levels.  Accordingly, let F(I, u) represent 
the property value of farmland when location-adjusted income is I and reservation utility is u, 
where the constant value from farm production is embedded in the structure of F.  In any year τ , 
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where π (z) is the yearly profit from farming.  Similar to above, if development is delayed, farm 
property value is the current return from farming plus the (discounted) expected value next 
period.  If development occurs, the new residents of ring r + 1 have a property value of 
) , ( , 1 1 τ τ + u I H r . 
In addition to the development decision on ring r + 1, the planner must select the input 
level z if he chooses to farm.  The combined surplus on rings r and r + 1 from farming r + 1 
during the current year is ψ (Ir, u, 1, g(z)) + pf(z) – wz, and the input level z
* that maximizes this 
surplus satisfies: 
(4)  pfz(z
*) = w – ψ e(⋅ )gz(z
*) 
where subscripts denote derivatives.  Denote the maximized value of surplus as ψ 1
*(I, u) + π (z
*). 
The planner’s development decision can then be expressed by the Bellman equation: 
  H1(Ir, u) + F(Ir+1, u) = max{ψ 1
*(Ir, u) + π (z
*) + β E[H1(Ir′ , u′ ) + F(Ir+1′ , u′ )], 
         H0(Ir, u) + H1(Ir+1, u) – k } 
where primes denote next period observations, and k is the conversion cost of development.  The 
left side of this equation represents the combined social property values of the two rings at the   10 
beginning of an arbitrary year.  Whether the second ring should be developed depends on which 
argument is larger inside the max operator.  The first argument represents the value of choosing 
to farm; the first two terms are the (maximal) current surplus from farming, and the remaining 
terms are the discounted value of the farming/developing choice in the following year.  The 
second argument is the value of developing.  If this option is selected, the property values at r 
and r + 1 become H0 and H1, respectively, based on the arguments above, and society must incur 
the one-time conversion cost k. 
For comparison with the competitive equilibrium below, it is convenient to subtract H1(Ir, 
u) from both sides of the Bellman equation.  The resulting functional equation simplifies to: 
(5)  F(Ir+1, u) = max{π (z
*) + β EF(Ir+1′ , u′ ), H1(Ir+1, u) – [H1(Ir, u) – H0(Ir, u)] – k}, 
because in the first argument of max{⋅ }, ψ 1
*(Ir, u) + β EH1(Ir′ , u′ ) – H1(Ir, u) = 0 if development 
is delayed. 
The planner will delay development as long as the first argument on the right side of 
equation (5) is greater than the second.  Rearranging terms, the inequality that triggers 
development is: 
(6)  H1(Ir+1, u) ≥  k + [π (z
*) + β EF(I′ , u′ )] + [H1(Ir, u) – H0(Ir, u)] 
Here, the property value at r + 1 after development has been isolated on the left side.  For 
development to be optimal, this amount must be at least as large as the sum of conversion cost 
and the two bracketed expressions.  The first of these expressions is the current and future 
agricultural value on ring r + 1, and the second is the reduction in property value on ring r due to 
development. 
  It can easily be shown that the operators on the right sides of equations (2) and (3) are 
contraction mappings under the development rule in (6); H1 and F thus have unique fixed points   11 
in the space of bounded and continuous functions (Stokey and Lucas).
3  To distinguish the 
socially optimal fixed points from the competitive case below, denote them H1
* and F
*, 
respectively.  Beginning with arbitrary guesses for H1 and F, the contraction property guarantees 
that a sequence of new guesses, derived by successive application of the rule in (6), will 
converge to H1
* and F
*.  Such a procedure is the basis of an empirical method to calculate the 
value functions. 
  Because the termination payoff H0 is increasing in I and there is positive persistence in 
the stochastic process of y (and hence Ir+1), the development rule is equivalent to dividing the 
domain of Ir+1 into two regions (conditional on u) such that development occurs the first time Ir+1 
crosses some barrier I(u) (Dixit and Pindyck).  Let I
*(u) denote the conversion barrier for the 
fixed points H1
* and F
*.  From (6) and the relationship Ir = Ir+1 + ∆ T, I
*(u) is implicitly defined 
by the equation: 
H1(I
*(u), u) = k + [π (z
*) + β EF(I′ , u′ )] + [H1(I
*(u) + ∆ T, u) – H0(I
*(u) + ∆ T, u)] 
Note that I
*(u) depends only on the shapes of the functions H0, H1
*, and F
*, and not on r.  The 
barrier that triggers development is thus the same at all locations; because adjusted income is 
larger for rings near the city center (small r), the barrier is reached earlier at these locations and 
they are the first to be developed.  The city expands outward as income continues to grow and 
the development barrier is reached at more distant locations. 
                                                 
3 Consider some operator M that takes an argument from some set and returns an element of the same set; i.e., θ  ∈  Θ  
and M(θ )∈  Θ .  Given a function d(θ , θ′ ) that measures the distance between any two members of Θ , M is a 
contraction mapping if and only if d(θ , M(θ )) > β d(M(θ ), M(M(θ ))), for some β  ∈  (0, 1).  That is, the distance 
between θ  and M(θ ) shrinks as M is applied repeatedly.  The contraction mapping theorem guarantees the existence 
of a unique fixed point of a contraction mapping in Θ : there exists θ
* ∈  Θ  such that M(θ
*) = θ
* (Stokey and Lucas).  
In the dynamic programming context here, Θ  is the set of bounded and continuous functions to which H1 and F must 
belong.  Blackwell established two sufficient conditions for a contraction.  First, the monotonicity condition requires 
that if d(θ 1, 0) > d(θ 2, 0) then d(M(θ 1), 0) > d(M(θ 2), 0).  Second, the discounting condition means that M(θ  + α ) ≤  
M(θ ) + βα , where α  is a scalar.  Because both operators in question satisfy these conditions, functions F and H1 that 
satisfy the recursive definitions in (2) and (3) exist and are unique.   12 
Figure 2 depicts the functions F
*, H1
*, and H0.  For all levels of income up to I
*(u), land is 
farmed and the property value is given by F
*.  Between I
*(u) and I
*(u) + ∆ T, land is developed 
and is adjacent to agriculture (land on the next ring is not yet developed) with a property value of 
H1
*.  Finally, above I
*(u) + ∆ T, agricultural externalities disappear because the next ring has been 
developed and the property value function is H0.   
In general, Ir exceeds Ir+1 by the marginal commuting cost ∆ T, and Ir+1 exceeds Ir+2 by the 
same amount.  At the levels of Ir, Ir+1, and Ir+2 depicted in the figure, property on ring r is the 
outermost developed land with a value of H1
*(Ir, u), and both rings Ir+1 and Ir+2 are farmed, with 
property values of F
*(Ir+1,  u) and F
*(Ir+2,  u), respectively.  In the year that Ir+1 grows large 
enough to cross the barrier I
*(u),  Ir will cross I
*(u) + ∆ T;  r + 1 will be developed and the 
agricultural externalities on ring r will be lost.  In the ensuing years, r + 1 will be the fringe of 
the city until Ir+1 reaches the barrier I
*(u) + ∆ T.  When that happens, Ir+2 will hit the development 
barrier and r + 1 becomes an interior ring of the city. 
Competitive Equilibrium Land Use with Taxes  
In a competitive equilibrium it is the farmers at r + 1, rather than a social planner, who 
must set input levels and make a development decision every year.  To see what interventions are 
needed to restore the social optimum in light of the two externalities, consider two policy 
instruments:  Tz, a per unit tax on agricultural inputs, and TD, a tax on development.  The 
development tax could take many forms (e.g., a tax on developers, a reduction in property tax 
liability for farmers, or a payment for the purchase of development rights).  
Assume farmers are profit maximizers and solve: max pf(z) – (w + Tz)z.  Competitive 
input levels z
c thus satisfy:  
(7)  pfz(z
c) = w + Tz.     13 
Let π (z
c) denote the corresponding value of farm profits.  The Bellman equation that describes 
farmers’ development choices can then be written: 
(8)  F(Ir+1, u) = max[ π
 (z
c) + β EF(I r+1′ , u′ ),  H1(I r+1, u) – k – TD] 
In a competitive equilibrium where developers buy farmland and improve the land into saleable 
housing lots, the second argument H1 – k – TD is the net sales price of farmland for development.  
The farmer will choose development the first time this sales price exceeds the value of farming.  
Rearranging, the development rule is: 
(9)  H1(Ir+1, u) ≥  k + π
 (z
c) + β EF(I
 ′ , u′ ) + TD 
Land is converted if development value exceeds the combined value of conversion cost, current 
and future returns from farming, and development taxes. 
  Similar to above, the development condition (9) applied to (2) and (3) defines fixed 
points for the value functions in competitive markets, denoted H1
c and F
c.  Given a set of taxes, 
these functions represent equilibrium property values of farmed and newly developed land at 
various income levels.  Associated with these functions, there exists some barrier value of 
income I
c(u) that triggers conversion.  If the economy cannot be planned, the task of a welfare-
maximizing government is to set taxes so that equilibrium allocations are socially optimal.   
Mathematically, the government’s problem is one of solving for the combination of Tz and TD 
that generate equilibrium inputs (z
c), property values (H1
c and F
c), and a development barrier 
(I




*(u), respectively.   
By comparing equations (4) and (7), the optimal set of taxes on farm inputs can be 
directly calculated as Tz = –ψ e(⋅ )gz(z
*).  These taxes, which are positive because ψ e is negative, 
imply that each farm input must be charged by the marginal cost of the pollution it imparts on 
nearby households.  If the cost of pollution is very high, taxes could potentially drive farm profits   14 
to zero.  In this case, landowners will exit agriculture and leave their land vacant while awaiting 
development (or sell the land to a speculator); essentially, sufficiently strong negative effects 
from farming implies development should be surrounded by a “greenbelt” that places a buffer 
between urban and agricultural activity. 
A comparison of equations (9) and (6) implies an optimal development tax of TD = H1(Ir, 
u) – H0(Ir, u).  If this tax is imposed jointly with the optimal input tax (so that z
c = z
*), the 
Bellman equation and development rule in (8) and (9) are identical to the corresponding 
expressions under optimal planning in (5) and (6).  Because there are unique fixed points for H1 
and F in each case, H1
c and F
c must coincide with H1
* and F
*, and it follows immediately that 
I
c(u) = I
*(u).  As one might expect, development should be taxed by the amount it reduces 
property value elsewhere, but a necessary condition for such a tax is regulations to correct other 
externalities; if inputs are not regulated, the development tax above is not appropriate.  
Of particular interest are the input levels and development time in an unregulated 
outcome when all taxes are set to zero.  Because optimal input taxes are positive, the competitive 
input levels in this case are strictly larger than the socially optimal ones.  For the time of 
development, a first inspection of condition (9) may suggest that removing the development tax 
must speed the rate of conversion because the criterion is more likely to be met.  However, the 
development decision also depends on the other terms in the inequality, and the net effect of 
policies depends on how these functions change.   
Because the value functions H1 and F are fixed points that are endogenously determined, 
these comparisons cannot be derived without specifying functional forms and stochastic 
processes for y and u.  The empirical simulations below provide a way of estimating such 
changes for a plausible description of modern urban areas.  In principle, an optimal set of   15 
policies may either speed or slow the rate of conversion because the two taxes act in opposite 
directions.  The development tax is an extra cost of development, but the input tax reduces the 
return to farming and adds a benefit to developing because new households are exposed to less 
pollution. 
A Numerical Policy Simulation of a Typical U.S. Metropolitan Area 
  Though a very small proportion of the land area in the United States is developed, the 
accelerating rate of conversion in recent decades has prompted many state and local governments 
to introduce land retention programs.  Meanwhile, increased concern about the health hazards of 
agricultural chemicals and animal waste have led to new or proposed environmental regulations, 
usually imposed at the federal level.  Because these two sets of policies are designed 
independently, the result is a group of piecemeal programs that are likely to work at cross-
purposes.  The land retention programs, typically in the form of property tax relief to farmers, 
have the marginal effect of raising the return to farming relative to development.  On the other 
hand, environmental regulations necessarily impose an extra cost on farmers, and the resulting 
improvement in environmental quality increases the potential value of development. 
Given data on land rents and estimates of non-market values for a particular urban area, 
the model above can be applied to estimate the optimal policy intervention and its likely effects.  
Theoretically, the pollution and land retention policies are related, but the empirical significance 
of their cross-effects would vary across cities.  To investigate the likely importance of this 
relationship for any city, the empirical analysis here uses data from all metropolitan areas in the 
United States. to estimate policies for a typical city.  The goal is to determine the optimal set of 
policies if they are chosen jointly, and compare them to the outcomes with single policies or with 
no regulation at all.   16 
  To accomplish this goal, the dynamic programming model developed above must be 
solved for the property value functions empirically.  Except for very special cases, these 
functional equation problems cannot be solved explicitly, but may be approximated to an 
arbitrary degree of accuracy through numerical computation methods (Dixit and Pindyck).  Such 
a numerical simulation procedure is developed below.  In these simulations, as in the theoretical 
model, the development value of land is assumed to derive from households’ bid rent, which in 
turn depends on income and the reservation utility level.  Because the focus is on an “average” 
urban area, the model abstracts from movements between cities.  Instead, urban development as 
a whole is explained by differences between metropolitan and non-metropolitan opportunities. 
In particular, the income variable I is specified as a metropolitan household income, 
while the reservation utility level u is based on income and consumption in non-metropolitan 
counties.  In short, conversion occurs because there is growth in the urban-rural wage gap.  The 
value of farmland, newly developed land, and property inside a city all conceptually depend on 
the state variables I and u.  By specifying functional forms in a judicious way, the two state 
variables are combined into a single measure that can be computed from observable data.  Each 
property value function is then interpolated over one state variable that represents the urban-rural 
opportunity gap. 
  As the theory predicts, development occurs at some location the first time the state 
variable crosses some barrier.  In addition to approximating the property value functions, the 
empirical model also generates a value of this conversion barrier that can be compared across the 
policy scenarios.  The optimal development tax is estimated from the approximated value 
functions, and the pollution tax is computed from an empirical specification of farm technology.    17 
Before the computational model is presented and its results are interpreted, the specification of 
functional forms and parameter values are described. 
Model Specification 
  To develop an operational simulation model, several empirically tractable functional 
forms are specified and parameterized.  First, a form for the bid rent function ψ  is derived from 
assumptions on utility and income.  Second, given this specification of bid rent, it is shown that 
the property value functions depend on a single variable, and that growth in this variable over 
time is the trigger for development.  The stochastic process for this variable is then specified and 
estimated.  Third, based on estimates from the environmental literature, values are chosen for the 
unobservable non-market parameters that affect the value of housing.  Finally, a functional form 
for agricultural technology is specified, and its parameters are calibrated to observed data.  All 
parameter values are summarized in Table 1. 
For the components of the bid rent function ψ (Ir, u, a, e) (equation (1)), gross income y is 
specified as metropolitan household income, and the transportation cost function as T(r) = b0 + 
b1r, where b0 is the (yearly) fixed cost of commuting and b1 is the cost of commuting an extra 
mile.  Location-adjusted income then becomes Ir = y – T(r) = y – b0 – b1r.  The values of b0 and 
b1 in Table 1 are based on a fixed toll/parking cost of $5 per day and a vehicle operation cost of 
30¢/mile.  Households’ utility functions are specified as the money-metric quasilinear form 
(Mas-Collel et al.): U(c, s, a, e) = c + ϕ (s) + γ a – δ e, where c is measured in real dollars of 
consumption, ϕ (s) is an increasing and concave function that measures the utility of land, γ  is the 
marginal value of farmland amenities, and δ  is the marginal social cost of pollution.  Because 
there is relatively little observed variation in lot sizes, they are assumed to be technologically 
fixed at s .   18 
Substituting these elements into the definition of bid rent: 
s
c I




= ψ max ) , , , ( 
         s.t.  u e a s c = δ − γ + ϕ + ) ( 
where u is the utility level available in non-metropolitan areas.  Because there is only one value 
of c that satisfies the constraint (c = u – ϕ (s ) – γ a + δ e), bid rent becomes the linear function:  
ψ (Ir, u, a, e) = (1/s )(Ir – u + ϕ (s ) + γ a – δ e).   
This linear specification can be further simplified by combining Ir and u into a single variable 
that avoids the need to measure u or ϕ (s ).  To accomplish this, let c ,  a , and e  be the non-
metropolitan levels of consumption and externalities per household.  Then 
e a s c u δ − γ + ϕ + = ) ( . Substituting this expression into ψ  yields a redefined bid rent function: 
) ˆ )( 1 ( ) , , ˆ ( e a I s e a I r r δ − γ + = ψ  
where Îr  = Ir – (c + γ a  – δ e ).  From this redefined function, note that ψ (Îr, 0, 0) = (1/s )Îr; this 
specification allows the value of housing to depend on the single state variable Îr, which is the 
metropolitan bid rent per household in the absence of agricultural externalities.  Empirically, the 
property value functions F, H0 and H1 can then be defined as functions of Îr, and land conversion 
is triggered by changes in this variable. 
These stochastic changes, in turn, can be estimated from first differences in a series of 
observations on Îr.  The precise interpretation of Îr is the rent paid to land only (i.e., not including 
the value of housing structures) for housing developments r miles from the city center.  Because 
a land parcel and housing structure are held by the same owner in practice, Îr cannot be directly 
observed, but there are conceptually two different methods for imputing an appropriate series 
from available data.  First, a series could be calculated from the definition of Îr above, given   19 
observations on (or estimates of) metropolitan income and transportation costs (y and T(r)), and 
non-metropolitan consumption and externalities (c ,  γ a , and δ e ).  Alternatively, it may be 
constructed by adjusting observed metropolitan housing rents to reflect the return to land alone.  
The second approach is the one adopted here. 
Data to estimate average yearly urban rents for two-bedroom housing is available from 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development for the years 1983-1998.  Because typical 
housing in the United States has three bedrooms,
4 these average rents are adjusted by the ratio of 
three- to two-bedroom housing values calculated from the 1997 American Housing Survey.   
Finally, land rent is computed by assuming that 15% of housing rents represent the return to land 
(Mills and Hamilton).  The yearly change in this series is assumed to be normally distributed, 
and the estimated mean (µ ) and standard deviation (σ ) of the first differences are reported in 
Table 1; bid rent at any location grows by an average of $36 per year with a standard deviation 
of $20. 
  Focusing on a well-documented and widespread type of agricultural pollution, Peterson et 
al. reviewed studies that estimate the aggregate health costs from farm chemicals in the United 
States.  Based on population data, these estimates imply costs from about $30 to $70 for an 
average household, although the costs for households near agriculture are likely to be higher than 
average.  The upper estimate of $70 is therefore taken as the value for damages at the suburban 
fringe, and it is varied between $50 and $90 (Table 1).  Because pollution is measured in dollars 
of damage, the parameter δ  is normalized to unity.  Following Peterson et al., pollution (e) is 
assumed to be a quadratic function of farm inputs: e = Bez
2, where Be is a technology constant.  
Since reliable estimates of pollution technology are absent, this function provides a first-order 
                                                 
4 According to the 1997 American Housing Survey, the median housing unit in the U.S. has 2.7 bedrooms.   20 
approximation to the underlying relationship between marginal damages and farm inputs. The 
constant Be is calibrated to the various levels of e based on the quadratic form. 
  Poe summarizes the estimates of non-market values for farmland amenities from the 
environmental literature.  Studies focused particularly on benefits to households at the suburban 
fringe (Krieger; Halstead; Bergstrom et al.) have found a household willingness-to-pay between 
$10 and $115 per year.  These estimates reflect the net external value of farmland, where survey 
respondents take the negative value of farm pollution into account.  The evidence thus suggests a 
gross non-market value of $60 to $225; the parameter γ  is set at a base level of $150 and varied 
throughout this range. 
  Based on aggregate output, input, and price series from the USDA-ERS (Ahearn et al.), 
Peterson et al. calibrated a constant returns to scale production function for the aggregate U.S. 
agricultural sector.  The calibrated function expressed agricultural output as a function of land 
and non-land aggregates.  By constant returns to scale, the production function for a typical acre 
can be derived by taking the ratio of inputs and output to land.  The resulting function is of the 
form  q = Bqz
α , where q expresses farm output per acre in value terms, Bq is a technology 
constant, and α  is the production elasticity of non-land inputs.  The agricultural return to land 
can then be written Bqz
α  – (w + Tz)z – C, where w is the price of non-land inputs and C is the 
return to productive factors other than land and non-land inputs (capital and labor).  The values 
of the parameters α , Bq, w, and C in Table 1 are calibrated based on the USDA price and input 
series. 
  The remaining parameters in Table 1 are the conversion cost of development k and the 
discount factor β .  The conversion cost is imputed from the difference in land rents for farming   21 
and residences in rural areas, assuming an infinite time horizon and irreversibility of 
development.
5  The discount factor assumes an annual discount rate of 10%. 
Computational Method 
  Several numerical methods have been developed for approximating the value functions in 
dynamic programming problems.  One common procedure is space discretization, where a large 
set of discrete points are selected for a continuous state variable, and the maximization inherent 
in the Bellman equation is performed at each of these points.  This method can approximate 
value functions of any shape, but to guarantee an accurate approximation the set of state points 
must be very large; especially if future realizations of the state variable are uncertain, the number 
of computations required can be prohibitive.  Another frequently used method is linear-quadratic 
approximation, where the value function is approximated by a second-order polynomial.  Here, 
the number of computations is smaller, but the approximant is not flexible enough for functions 
with discontinuities irregular shapes.   
To overcome these difficulties, Miranda and Fackler suggest that numerical functional 
equation problems be solved by collocation methods, which can find a close approximation to an 
arbitrary function with a limited number of computational steps.  Here, the property value 
functions are approximated using a linear spline collocation procedure.  To illustrate this method, 
consider approximating an arbitrary value function v(x) that satisfies the canonical Bellman 
equation v(x) = maxX {f(x, X) + β Ev(x′ )}, where x′  = h(X, ε ), and ε  is a random variable that 
                                                 
5 In particular, average rents to farmland and rural developed land are calculated for the years 1985-1994 based on 
farm cash rent data from USDA/ERS, and the American Housing Survey, respectively.  Based on new construction 
cost and sales data, Mills and Hamilton report that the value of land represents about 15% of rents paid for housing 
services.  Decomposing non-metropolitan rents in this way and assuming lot sizes of 0.35 acres, developed land 
received an average yearly rent of $2130 in excess of agricultural rent per acre per year.  This differential represents 
the return to the capital investment of conversion.  Assuming an infinite time horizon, irreversibility, and a discount 
rate of 10%, the capitalized value of this conversion cost is $21,300 per acre, as reported in Table 1.   22 
represents noise.   Here, x is the state variable, X is the control variable, and x′  is the (random) 
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where φ 1,…, φ J is a series of linear spline functions and m = (m1,…,mJ) is a set of weights that 
must be determined.  The approximant is thus a linear combination of J functions.   
Geometrically, linear splines approximate a function by a set of J – 1 linear segments between J 
uniformly spaced breakpoints in some specified interval, where the segments are spliced together 
to preserve continuity at all the breakpoints.
6 
In the collocation method, one begins by specifying a domain of x where the function will 
be approximated and selecting a set of J points in the domain, called collocation nodes, where 
(10) is required to hold exactly.  By convention, the nodes for linear spline functions are set at 
the J uniformly spaced breakpoints to optimize computational cost (Miranda and Fackler).  Once 
the weight vector m has been determined, the approximant can be evaluated at an arbitrary non-
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To evaluate the expectation, a series of discrete points ε 1,…, ε N in the domain of the random 
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where d = (a – b)/(J – 1).   23 
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  The collocation method finds the m vector by successive approximations.  That is, it 
begins with some guess m
(0) (which in turn implies some guess for the value function), and 
solves the maximization on the right side of the Bellman equation for each collocation node xi.  
The maximized value becomes a new guess for the value function at each node and is used to 
update the guess for m.  Letting x = (x1,…, xJ) be the vector of collocation nodes, and v
(1)(x) 
represent the vector of new guesses for the value function (i.e., v
(1)(x) =  (v
(1)(x1), …, v
(1)(xJ)), the 
updated guess of weights m
(1) is the solution to the system: v
(1)(x) = Φ m
(1), where the (i, j)th 
element of Φ  is φ j(xi).  In the next iteration, m
(1) is used as the original guess to calculate a new 
set of guesses for the value function v
(2)(x), which in turn is used to find a new guess of weights 
m
(2).  This process continues until convergence, when the change in guesses falls below some 
small tolerance level.  As long as β  < 1 and the functions f and h meet certain technical 
conditions, the Contraction Mapping Theorem guarantees that such a procedure will converge to 
the unique value function (Stokey and Lucas). 
  The collocation method is used to approximate the value of housing property inside the 
city (H0), the value of farmland and newly developed land (H1), and the value of farmland (F) 
under four different policy scenarios: (a) socially optimal joint policies, (b) an unregulated 
equilibrium (no policies), (c) an input tax only, and (d) a development tax only.  Each model is 
coded and solved the in Matlab 5.3, with a convergence tolerance level of 10
-8.  J = 200 
collocation nodes for the state variable Î are specified over the range [0, 1000], and N = 160   24 
discrete values for the normally distributed change in income and their associated probabilities 
are calculated by Gaussian quadrature (Gerald and Wheatley).
7 
  Each policy setting is solved in three steps.  First, to calculate farm input levels, the 
functions Bqz
α  – (w + Tz) – C is maximized, where Tz is set either to the internalizing level –ψ egz 
= 2Bez (cases (a) and (c)) or zero (cases (b) and (d)).  Farm profits π  are then set to the 
maximized value of the objective function, pollution is calculated from the optimal input level 
according to the quadratic emissions function e = Bez
2, and the bid rent of newly developed land 
is set to ψ 1 = Î – γ  – e.  In the model, ψ 1 is represented by a J × 1 vector that measures the 
housing return at each collocation node of Î. 
  Second, the value of property inside the city H0 is interpolated in a loop.  By definition, 
the fixed point of this function satisfies: H0(Î) = ψ 0(Î) + β EH0(Î′ ); like ψ 1,  H0 and ψ 0 are J-
vectors that represent property value and housing returns, respectively, at each node of Î (note 
that the ψ 0 = Î by construction of Î).  For some guess of H0, the vector m satisfies H0 = Φ m; an 
updated guess can be calculated by: H0′  = ψ 0 + β EH0, and m is updated by solving H0′  = Φ m′ .  
The process continues until the norm of m′  – m is less than 10
-8. 
Third, another loop jointly interpolates the value functions for housing property on the 
edge of the city and farmland (H1 and F, respectively).  The fixed points of these functions must 
satisfy the functional equations in (2) and (3) and the development rule in (9), where TD equals 
either the optimal tax (cases (a) and (d)) or zero (cases (b) and (c)).  Beginning with any set of 
guesses F and H1, the algorithm searches for the smallest node of Î where (9) is satisfied; i.e., at 
this critical node Îdev, H1 = k + π  + β EH1 + TD.  In the cases where TD is nonzero, it is set to TD = 
                                                 
7 Thus, E[Îr+1,t+1] = Îr+1,t +Σnε nPn, where the pairs (ε n, Pn) are points on a normal density function with mean µ  and 
standard deviation σ .   25 
H1(Îdev + b1) – H0(Îdev + b1).
8  At any node less than Îdev, the updated guess for F is determined by 
F′  = π  + β EF, while at and above Îdev, F′  = H1.
9  Since H1 becomes H0 at Îdev + b1, the updated 
guess is H1′  = ψ 1 + β EH1 at nodes below Îdev + b1 and H1′  = H0 for those above it.  As in the first 
loop, the fixed points of F and H1 have been found when the changes in successive guesses is 
small. 
Results 
  Table 2 provides the results for the four simulations at base parameter values.  As one 
would expect, if policies are chosen jointly (the socially optimal case), both taxes are positive 
($1.12/lb. and $730/acre for the input and development taxes, respectively).  From farmers’ 
perspective the policies are quite dramatic:  Compared to the unregulated case, the tax on non-
land input more than doubles the effective price, forcing farmers to reduce input levels by more 
than two-thirds (17 vs. 46 lbs.), and decreasing farm returns by about one-third ($29 vs. $41).  If 
farmland were never developed, its value would be an infinite stream of discounted farm returns; 
for a discount rate of 10%, this capitalized use value falls by the same factor as yearly return, 
from about $450 to about $320 per acre.  When farmland is developed, the owner would be 
assessed a tax that is roughly double the agricultural use value. 
  On the other hand, because conversion costs are so high, the substantial effects on 
agriculture do not have much leverage in changing the value of developed land or the time of 
conversion.  Just before farmland is converted, nearly all its value (97%) is from the option of 
developing.  The stopping value of household bid rent where development occurs differs by 
                                                 
8 In the year that Îr+1 reaches Îdev and development occurs, the amenity benefits of ring r are lost.  Because Îr that 
year is Îdev + ∆ T = Îdev + b1, the appropriate development tax is H1(Îdev + b1) – H0(Îdev + b1). 
9 To avoid the large discontinuity between F and H1, the model actually interpolates F
 + = F + k + TD so that F
 + = H1 
in the vicinity of conversion.  The updating rule for F
 + (below Îdev) then becomes F
 +′  = π (z
*) + (1 – β )(k + TD) + 
β EF
 +.   26 
about $40 between the two cases; based on an expected yearly increase of $36 (Table 1), this 
difference implies that conversion times are expected to differ by only one or two years.   
Interestingly, the smaller conversion barrier under social management implies that land should 
be developed earlier.  Even though the development tax adds another cost to conversion, it is 
apparently outweighed by the extra benefit of reduced pollution.   
  The individual effects of the policies are exposed in the last two columns.  If the input tax 
is imposed alone, it is identical to the socially optimal case ($1.12).  Accordingly, the effect on 
input prices, input levels, agricultural returns, and pollution is also the same.  Unlike the social 
optimum, there is no development tax to deter conversion, and compared to the unregulated case, 
the development barrier is reduced by $60 to $663.   
  If there is no input tax but a development tax instead, inputs, farm returns, and pollution 
levels are the same as the unregulated equilibrium.  The development tax is smaller than the joint 
policy case ($348 vs. $730) because higher levels of pollution reduce the return to developments 
near agriculture, and the loss of farm activity therefore imposes a smaller cost on those residents.  
Starting from an unregulated economy, this development tax raises the conversion barrier by $16 
to $739.  Consistent with intuition, the two taxes work in opposite directions, but the marginal 
effect of the development tax is smaller than that of the input tax.  It is therefore not surprising 
that the overall effect of joint policies is to lower the development threshold.   
  Peterson reports the optimal and unregulated simulation results at alternative parameter 
values that vary over the ranges in Table 1.  As one might expect, changes in environmental 
values have a direct effect on the size of optimal policies.  The different levels of pollution 
damage vary by about 30% from the base case and generate input taxes that vary from the base 
by about 20%.  The high and low amenity values represent a 50% increase and a 60% decrease   27 
from the base level, and lead to about a 70% increase and 80% decrease in development taxes, 
respectively.  On the other hand, these substantial policy changes have relatively less effect on 
farm returns, pollution, and the development barrier, which differ from their base values by no 
more than 10%, 5%, and 15%, respectively.   
Across the four cases, the optimal development barrier is only $20 to $60 below the free 
market barrier, but the policies affect farmers more than developers.  Even at the lowest 
specification of pollution damages, the input tax rate is about 90%, causing input levels to fall by 
more than half; the lowest amenity value still generates a development tax that is more than half 
the use value farmland.  Thus, the two most important qualitative results appear to be robust: a 
social manager will convert land earlier than free markets, but the change in development 
patterns is small compared to the effect on farmers. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the interpolated value functions at base parameter values for the 
optimal and unregulated cases, respectively.  When bid rent values are low, land remains in 
farming, but its value (F) appreciates because of the steadily increasing option value of 
developing.  At the threshold level of bid rent where development occurs ($683 and $723 for the 
two cases, respectively), H1 becomes the relevant value function; it measures the property value 
of newly developed land that is still adjacent to agriculture.  The discontinuity between F and H1 
reflects conversion cost and development taxes.  The second discontinuity in the functions is 
when the adjacent agricultural land is also developed and agricultural externalities disappear.   
From then on, the property value becomes H0.  
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
  This chapter has determined the optimal development pattern for farmland by considering 
both the multifunctional and dynamic nature of land use.  When agriculture generates pollution   28 
as well as amenity benefits, the policy rules to correct the two externalities are standard results: 
polluting farm inputs should be regulated so that their marginal benefit in production equals the 
marginal social cost of pollution, and development should be taxed by the amount it reduces the 
value of nearby property. 
  Yet, when these rules are applied together and the irreversibility of development is taken 
into account, the final result can contradict conventional wisdom.  In particular, this chapter has 
demonstrated both the theoretical and empirical possibility that unregulated markets remove land 
from agriculture too slowly.  Conceptually, optimal policies will speed the rate of farmland 
conversion if the added value of developing land next to “cleaner” agriculture outweighs the 
burden of development taxes.  Simulations based on data from major U.S. metropolitan areas 
predict such an outcome over a large range of environmental parameters.  
In a growing city with expanding housing needs, development at some location may be 
optimally delayed, but not stopped indefinitely.  Agricultural land just beyond the urban fringe 
only affect nearby developments until it too is developed; an optimal set of policies that speeds 
conversion thus allows new suburban residents to enjoy a higher quality agricultural landscape 
slightly earlier. 
  In practice, the multiple externalities from agriculture are addressed separately.  Local 
zoning requirements, state land retention programs, as well as federal environmental laws 
regulate farmland choices in any community.  Often, the environmental provisions are not 
targeted specifically to mitigate the forms of pollution that are most costly at the suburban fringe.   
In some cases, communities attempt environmental controls of their own.  In others, the 
private market eliminates some of the problem because low polluting operations, such as organic 
farms or community supported agriculture, provide outputs of high value to the surrounding   29 
community.  When the environmental quality of farmland is improved, we are likely to observe a 
faster rate of development, and farmland retention goals may become more difficult to meet.  
Our results imply that such a change is not surprising, nor may it be a reason for serious concern. 
Because the returns to housing are so much higher than those from farming and 
conversion costs are so large, farm policies in general do not have much leverage in influencing 
land use.  Our empirical simulations suggest that even very large farm policies (taxes that are 
several hundred percent of pre-policy prices) will cause the development timing at any location 
to change by no more than a few years.     30 
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Figure 2.  Fixed Point Property Value Functions Table 2.  Simulation Results, Base Parameter Values
Social Unregulated Input  Tax Dev.  Tax
Item Optimum Equilibrium Only Only
Input tax($/lb) 1.12 0 1.12 0
Input price (including tax, $/lb) 2.20 1.08 2.20 1.08
Development tax ($/acre) 730 0 0 348
Non-land farm inputs (lb./acre) 16.9 45.9 16.9 45.9
Agricultural pollution damage ($/household) 9.43 70 9.43 70
Bid-rent conversion barrier ($/acre) 683 723 663 739
Return to farmland ($/acre) 28.92 40.66 28.92 40.66
Use value of farmland ($/acre) 318 447 318 447
Farm property value at time of conversion ($/acre) 12195 13538 12273 13639
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